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The role of copper money within the dynamics of sovereign debt and the 
perception of unsound fiat money in early 17
th
- century Castile 
 
Claudia de Lozanne Jefferies1 
The aim of the following paragraphs is to assess the role of fiat copper coins within the 
cycle of negotiations and approvals concerning sovereign debt in Castile during the 
first 3 decades of the 17th- Century. The perception of unsound fiat money will be 
studied using primary sources. The attitudes of contemporaries towards the 
transformation of coins from quasi- commodity money into unsound fiat money will 
be featured within the context of Castile's legal and political framework, highlighting 
alternatives to a devaluation and suggestions to introduce types of currency other than 
fiat money. 
Introduction 
In line with Natural Law principles, the political constitution Early Modern Castile 
stipulated against the introduction of any tax which had not previously been approved by the 
Towns council Cortes de Castilla. Representatives of the main 18 cities in the Kingdom had a 
seat in such council, which not only determined the level of taxation the Kingdom would be 
subjected to by the Crown, but it prevented the use of the fiscal system by the Crown for the 
purpose of financing sovereign deficit. Being in control of fiscal revenues, the Towns also had 
a stake in determining the level and composition of sovereign debt. 
Using a discourse of contingency, the Crown managed to be granted permission by the 
Towns in 1597 to mint fiat money in the form of copper coins, which constituted an extension 
to the Crown's fiscal governance at the expense of the Towns and ultimately the subjects. The 
role of inflation tax as a source to finance an ever expanding sovereign debt will be assessed 
by taking into consideration the debt negotiating process between Towns, Crown and foreign 
bankers. 
The transition from one form of money into another aroused controversy, and treatises 
were produced, which reflect the perception of a change from commodity money, or quasi- 
commodity money into unsound fiat money. A selection of those treatises will be featured in 
the following paragraphs. The suggestions as to how to go about with a new form of currency 
will be analysed within the context of Castile's legal and fiscal framework. 
Castile's fiscal system and the bargaining power of towns 
The Castilian Towns played a crucial role in the tax approval, introduction and 
collection processes. Given the expansive fiscal policy attempted by the Crown during the 
first half of the 17th- century, the Towns gathered political importance as the Crown needed 
the approval of the Towns Assembly to increase fiscal pressure. The political strength of the 
Towns as far as the localities were concerned, was in part a consequence of a precarious 
transport system that acted as an obstacle to the royal authority in establishing its presence in 
remote places. The Crown needed the Towns in order to reach through to the localities, 
therefore, the Town Councils dominated local politics. The Crown’s main political scope of 
action was limited to overseas politics,2 however, the financing of foreign wars depended on 
                                                 
1 City University London, Claudia.Jefferies.1@city.ac.uk 
2 In broad terms, it could be stated that the main forces determining Castilian politics in the first half of the 17th - 
century were the Towns and the Crown. The heavily indebted aristocracy was undergoing 
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the Crown’s ability to obtain credits from its Genoese bankers, which was also determined by 
fiscal issues in line with Castile’s internal fiscal capacity, as will be featured in further 
paragraphs. 
After the death of Phillip II (1598), Spain faced a serious situation of fiscal deficit, as 
all the tax revenues with the exemption of the American metals had been committed to 
interest payments of Castile’s consolidated debt. The Crown faced an increased need to look 
for ways of financing its expenses, and given the exhaustion of the tax revenues, the only way 
was to increase fiscal pressure on its subjects, through the route of forcing Towns to approve 
the expansion of consolidated sovereign debt, which was serviced through taxes. 
The millones tax was an extraordinary tax approved by the Towns in 1590, 8 years 
prior to the death of Phillip II. Originally, 8 million ducats (hence its name) were to be 
collected and paid to the Crown within a period of 6 years. Under expansive fiscal policy, the 
millones tax was repeatedly re- negotiated during the first half of the 17th- century reaching in 
1638 the amount of 24 million ducats to be paid by the Towns to the Crown within the period 
of 6 years, after failing attempts by the Crown to introduce centrally managed taxes such as 
the controversial salt tax and the tax on stamped paper, both in the decade of the 1630’s.3 
At a local level, the millones tax was collected through sisas, consumption taxes 
imposed on wine, meat and oil.4 The fact that it affected basic consumption goods made the 
millones tax particularly unpopular. 5  The taxes approved and collected by the Towns 
amounted to more than half of the Crown’s total income in 1601.6 Hence the importance of 
the Towns, and their ability to constitute an oppositional force. 
There is little doubt about the fact that the millones tax was the main source of 
political opposition by both the Towns and by the Church during the first half of the 17th –
century. The resilience from the part of the Towns to accept any further expansive fiscal 
measures was put down the magnitude of that extraordinary tax. 
The dynamics of debt 
In order to understand debt dynamics in 17th- Century Spain, it is necessary to explore 
the mechanisms governing the nature of the Castilian sovereign debt. As it has been pointed 
out in recent literature,7 there are fundamental conceptual differences between early modern 
sovereign debt and foreign debt in more recent periods. The concept of state and its 
accompanying legitimating mechanisms play a very important role in defining the concept of 
debt. 
The Crown’ s ability to borrow short-term funds (asientos)8 from the Genoese bankers, 
was determined by the possibility of converting that debt into long term debt (juros). Floating, 
                                                                                                                                                        
transformation. Nobles tended to abandon their estates and migrate either to the Court in Madrid or to 
urban centres, taking over the most profitable offices and posts in the Town Councils (Sanchez Belen, 
1989: 175- 176). The aristocracy as a whole did not represent an oppositional political force at the time 
(Ruiz Martín, 1990,:20).  
3 Gelabert, 1998: 280. 
4 Niehaus, 1984:137- 138, Ruiz Martín, 1990: 490. 
5 The tax was originally conceived as a supplement to the alcabala tax, which was a 10% duty on purchases. The 
alcabala was collected by the town councils on behalf of the Crown. The introduction of the millones 
tax was justified by the fact that only a fraction of that 10% was actually collected. Taxes were paid on 
corporate basis and negotiated between group representatives (we refrain from using the word “guilds” 
to refer to such groups) and town councils (Ruiz Martín, 1994, 171). Amounts settled were paid in 
advance to the Crown (encabezamiento). This method allowed the Crown to perceive a steady income 
from the Towns, which was convenient for the Crown, despite the fact that the amount actually 
collected was in most cases higher than the one settled in advance. 
6 Kamen, 1983, 319 
7 See for instance Alvarez, 2003, p. 2-3, 
8 An interest of 12% was payable on asientos for the year, and 8% for every subsequent year. 
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short- term debt constituted only a proportion9 of the total debt held by the Crown at any one 
time. There was an incentive from the side of the Crown to convert floating into consolidated 
debt, due to the fact that the interest rate on floating debt was almost twice as high as the one 
on consolidated debt.10 Sovereign debt was served through tax collections carried out by the 
18 towns composing the Towns Council (Cortes de Castilla). It was not centralized, being 
managed by the localities, as it was dependent on the Kingdom’s fiscal capacity. Taxation 
was within the realm of the Towns.  
Of course, the lower the arrivalsof precious metals from the American colonies, the 
higher the Crown s reliance on foreign debt, hence the importance of the Towns’ willingness 
to convert foreign (floating) debt into sovereign debt. It should be added that the arrivals of 
precious metals were erratic and particularly low during the 17th Century (see fig1).  
Fig 1: 
 
Source: Hamilton, 1934. 
Given Spain’s involvement in the Thirty Year’s War, most of the Crown’s income was 
sent out of Spain to cover military expenses, increasing the importance of “short-term credits” 
issued by Genoese bankers. The issuance of those credits was based on expectations about 
volumes of precious metals arriving and about the Crown succeeding to negotiate with the 
Towns on tax matters. The whole meaning of state bankruptcies as signalling strategies is also 
                                                 
9 Alvarez, 2011., Gelabert, 1998. 
10 Interest on floating debt was about 12% pa., whereas interest on consolidated debt was about 5-7%. Ibid. 
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to be found within the rationale of this debt negotiating process, as it has been explained in 
the previously referenced sources. 
Floating debt was converted into consolidated debt through an approval procedure by 
the Towns known as “medios generales”. Foreign bankers were granted privileges, in addition 
to the yield of the debt certificates. Such privileges could take the form of preferential time in 
redeeming the debt certificates and/or “picking and choosing” which particular taxes should 
service the credit offered to the Crown. This procedure allowed the Crown to increase its 
capacity to obtain foreign credit, as once floating debt was turned into consolidated debt, there 
was room for the agreement of further debt contracts with the Genoese bankers. 
The role of copper coins within the dynamics of debt and attitudes towards the changing 
nature of money 
The issue of coin debasement within the context of foreign debt in early modern 
Castile has been explained as a means to support the process of expanding the Crown’s 
capacity to obtain further foreign credit.11 Seigniorage derived from specie, would take the 
form of a centralised tax. The increase in the Crown's credit capacity mentioned before 
applies in particular to the period after 1619, when new credit agreements were backed by 
monetary expansions carried out from 1617. As it is well known, the issuance of unsound 
money as continued throughout the following six decades, not without the resistance of the 
Towns. This was a reaction against changes in the nature of money, which marked a turning 
point in the way in which money was perceived. Table 1 depicts the alterations carried out to 
copper coins from 1566 to 1628, using the 4- maravedi piece as a representative coin. A 
reduction in the intrinsic value of copper money is observable, which manifested itself as a 
reduction of its value to weight ratio.  
Table 1: 
 
The coins issued from 1597, whose value to weight ratio was remarkably lower than 
those minted in 1566 are the ones that triggered the first reactions against the practice of coin 
debasement in 17th- century Castile. The opprobrium met by such practices was in line with 
the concept of money as commodity money. This concept was in line with the system of 
Castilian political representation, as it prevented the introduction of an inflationary tax by the 
Crown without the approval of the Towns. In the following paragraphs, a reaction against 
                                                 
11 Gelabert, 1998, p. 276-277. 
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debasement aiming at preventing the infiltration of central powers into the domain of the 
locality and, ultimately, the individual, will be presented. 
a) Commodity money and Castile's political structure 
Perhaps the best known manifestation against the abuse of the regal right to mint 
unsound money is found in Juan de Mariana’s (1536-1624) plead against coin debasement in 
his De Monetae Mutatione. His argument against coin debasement is scholastic in essence, 
similar to the one to be found in the writings of Nicolas d’Oresme (ca. 1328-1582):12 The 
Prince does not hold ownership of his subject’s possessions (money included). He argues that 
coin debasement has a tax character, and the introduction of taxes is only legitimate after its 
approval through a consensus. Mariana declares that the mint of coins with a low intrinsic 
value is illegal and contravenes Natural law.13 He perceives a flaw in the system of Castilian 
political representation, which gave way to a breech in the legal procedure of tax approval. 
Town representation happened at two levels: Town representatives in the towns (cabildos) 
had delegates (procuradores), who would represent the Towns’ interests at the Towns 
assembly (cortes). Mariana blames the procuradores for that breech and accuses them of 
greed and of serving their own interests before addressing the needs of the people.14 In his 
rhetorical style, he warns his readers about the increasing power gathered by them, making 
reference to the “Cedars of Lebanon”. The whole breech denotes a grey area: the discourse of 
contingency, which could be seen as a “leak” through which central power penetrated through 
representative political systems in the early modern period. Machiavelli’s Discourses are 
perhaps the best known example of the use of the resource of “necessitas” as a strategic 
device which reinforces a monarch’s central power.  
It is in “necessitas” that the first issues of debased copper coins found a justification. 
To this respect, Mariana refers to Philippe de Commines (1447- 1511), stating that although 
the people should show willingness to help their Prince when the kingdom is in need, the 
Prince should listen to the people and determine whether or not there is enough “strength and 
substance” in the people to assist the Prince.15 
Mariana agrees with the concession of the regal stamp to the monarch and with the 
right of the Prince to make use of it to issue coins in the shape and value he decides, as long 
as his subjects are not negatively affected by it. On the face of “necessitas”, he agrees with the 
idea of the monarch minting coins with low intrinsic value as long as the length of such 
practice would be short and the subjects would be fully compensated for the damage they 
would potentially suffer as a consequence. Mariana enforces his argument to this respect by 
presenting the example of Emperor Frederick II (1194- 1250), whose army was under siege in 
Faenza during a winter. Lacking the means to pay his troops, he issued leather coins using his 
regal stamp. Mariana explains that being under siege, the Emperor was unable to hold an 
imperial diet and therefore, he engaged in the practice of issuing coins with no intrinsic value 
without adequate consultation. Mariana adds that the Emperor compensated his subjects in 
full as soon as the siege was over. After referring to other examples of siege currency, he 
concludes that it is in principle inappropriate not to consult the subjects before making use of 
the regal stamp to issue money with low intrinsic money, even in the case of a siege.  
“Necessitas” was, according to Mariana, no justification for debasing the currency. 
This point is of great relevance, as it reflects the argument used by the Crown and accepted by 
the procuradores representing Towns, when the intrinsic value of vellón was reduced. 
Mariana argues that monarchs are compelled to devalue following the issue of coins with low 
intrinsic value and he opposes to the principle of a devaluation. He provides examples of 
                                                 
12 Oresme’s Tractatus de Origine, Natura, Jure et Mutationibus Monetarum (1360?) does not figure amongst 
Mariana’s sources. 
13 Mariana, 1609 (1987), p. 69. 
14 Mariana, 1609 (1987), p.36. 
15 Mariana, 1609, p. 36. 
96 
devaluations carried out by Elizabeth I (1551) and Henry VII (1526 and 1542) in England and 
points out the unpopularity of such measures. He adds that the Florentine poet Dante Alighieri 
called Philippe IV “le Bel” (the fair) (1285-1314) “falsificatore di moneta” (coin 
counterfeiter) for that reason.16 
b) The transition from the belief in sound fiat money into the acceptance of unsound fiat money 
The first issues of vellón did not upset the monetary system, as there was a relatively 
scarcity of currency of small denomination. Additionally, the expectation prevailed that there 
would be the possibility of exchanging the debased coins for the equivalent of their face value 
in silver. The money circulating had acquired the character of sovereign credit or sound fiat 
money. Faith in being reimbursed is the essence of preserving the purchasing power of fiat 
money, due to its credit nature. That faith depended, in the case of vellón, on the levels of 
arrivals of precious metals from New Spain and Peru, which determined the levels of silver in 
circulation and the proportion of silver currency in respect to vellón. As the arrivals of 
precious metals had been at their highest towards the turn of the 16th into the 17th century, 
expectations of the volumes that would arrive were higher than the actual volumes arriving, as 
these last ones showed a downward trend throughout a great part of the century.  
Towards the end of the second decade, there was still the hope for a monetary reform 
to take place, which would up to some point revert the effects of coin debasement. This is 
manifest in treatises such as the one by Pedro López de Reyno,17 who issued a stabilisation 
proposal in 1618, in which he presented a plan that consisted of a monetary reform carried out 
and financed by the Crown. His work was entitled: Discursos Políticos Cristianos, and, as a 
self- confessed devote Christian, his prescriptions were in line with notions of Christian 
justice, as the ones found in Mariana’s and the influential Christian political philosopher 
Pedro de Ribadeneira (1527- 1611). López de Reyno's proposal includes a monetary reform 
through the introduction of a new currency with silver content. Since silver was scarce, he 
suggests to melt down the existing silver coins which still circulated in the Kingdom in order 
to get the silver necessary to produce the alloy that the new coins would consist of. Those new 
coins would then be exchanged for the copper coins, however, the subjects would incur in a 
loss, as they would not get the full amount corresponding to the nominal value of the copper 
coins they possessed. 
The problem was not solved in 1618, and the issuance of unsound coins continued. As 
a consequence, the silver premium kept soaring and the likelihood of the Crown being able to 
take full responsibility for the solution to the problem wore increasingly thin. The question 
arose amongst authors of stabilisation proposals of who should cover the costs of a monetary 
reform. This question was accompanied by ethical considerations. The issue about the Crown 
carrying out a devaluation and the ways in which this could be justified according to different 
concepts of justice became centrepiece in the discussion about the monetary situation. 
In the various ways to either justify or reject the idea of a devaluation, different 
interest groups took particular stances when it came to either rejecting or justifying such 
measure. The production of treatises of this kind mark a separation from the mere point 
Mariana was arguing for in his de Monetae: the contradiction between the legal way of 
introducing a tax, this would be with the subjects’ authorisation; and imposing such tax by 
royal decree without consulting the subjects, which implies the illegal penetration of central 
power through the realm of local power.  
One group was formed by authors who believed that the Crown should carry out a 
devaluation without offering any compensation to the subjects. 18  These authors use the 
                                                 
16Mariana, 1609, p. 73. 
17  López de Reyno, Pedro, Discursos puliticos (sic) cristianos para el bien destos (sic) reinos, 1918-30. 
Handwritten copy, Mss. 1092, fol. 223r-316-bis r. 
18 A good example of an author belonging to this group is Manuel López Pereyra (1627?), BNM, Mss.6731, fol. 
72v-73r. 
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“common good” as a justification for such action. They believe that, as prices would decrease 
after the devaluation, and the intrinsic value of money would increase, the subjects would 
benefit in that way. The opinion that any damage to subjects can be compensated through an 
enhancement of the Kingdom’s “public utility” was issued by the representative of the 
Supreme Council of Italy in 1626.19 
There were other authors who, despite being in favour of the Crown carrying out a 
devaluation, lobbied in favour of a “mild” stabilisation policy. A good example is the 
Milanese merchant Gerardo Basso, author of the stabilisation programme put into practice in 
1627. Basso opposes to the idea of a devaluation without offering the subjects compensation 
for their losses and designs a sterilisation mechanism through which the subjects would 
deposit their unsound money in exchange for debt certificates that would yield an interest of 
5% p.a. The money collected by the Crown would be used to produce a new currency with a 
higher intrinsic value using silver arriving from America and other funds originated from tax 
revenues. This plan held the Crown as principal financing source for the stabilisation policy, 
although the subjects would indirectly contribute through taxes. Basso opposes to a 
devaluation without compensation based on justice as well as religious considerations: He 
makes direct reference to the idea of a “Christian Prince” by highlighting the incompatibility 
between a devaluation and such an ideal.20  
The underlying idea in Basso’s proposal, however, was a “swap” of inflation tax 
against other, locally collected taxes. 
A further interesting writing which presents a secular view of the currency crisis is the 
one issued by Francisco de Arizmendi (1627?). This author opposes to a devaluation and 
proposes instead a straight- forward monetary reform carried out by the Crown. He does 
detect the problem of silver shortage in the hands of the Crown to carry out his plan, so he 
suggests using the Silver that would potentially arrive from America as one of the sources for 
the monetary reform. He also designs a plan through which the subject’s silver would be 
exchanged against certificates of sovereign debt (juros) in order to obtain silver for the newly 
created currency. A third source of silver is seen by him in the treasures held by the Church, 
and finds it as “licit” to dispose of the silver on altars for purposes of monetary reform.21 
Arizmendi adds that only the silver that is necessary for the practice of liturgy should 
be left in churches, the rest should be used to mint the new currency.22 This suggests a transfer 
of resources from the Church to the Crown, putting the needs of the state before not only the 
Church´s wealth, but before sacred objects as well. His stance is secular and in line with the 
idea of a reason of state. 
Both of the stabilisation proposals described above resulted in the expansion of 
sovereign debt to be financed by taxation in one way or the other. 
As it has been already mentioned, Gerardo Basso´s “mild” plan was put into practice 
in 1627 as a stabilisation attempt. The project was abandoned 9 months afterwards, and a 
devaluation of 50% was carried out by decree. The nominal value of all copper coins was 
reduced by half, without any compensation for the subjects. 
Many stabilisation proposals were produced between March and December 1627, time 
during which the plan was put in practice. Those proposals can be seen as a reaction against 
the scheme described above, as the Towns assembly, Cortes de Castilla had not been 
consulted previous to the introduction of such policy. According to Castilian law, the 
                                                 
19 “…y cuando haya algún daño de particulares, es cierto que ha de ceder al útil público del reyno (sic)…”, 
Caimo, 1625, BNM, Mss 6731 fol.61 v. 
20 “…y si a caso, se hiciera la baja, se les quita a los vasallos en un día quince millones, según esto, cómo 
podrían cumplir con los servicios Reales, y a sus tratos y comercios, no es posible que se pueda creer 
haya cristianos que lo digan.”, Basso, 1626, BNM, VE 195-2 fol. 5r. 
21 “Sería lícito despojar los altares de que se saca la importancia de esta materia…”, Arizmendi, BNM, Mss. 
6731, fol. 106r. 
22 Arizmendi, BNM, Mss. 6731, fol. 109r 
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introduction of the stabilisation plan had been illegal. The same argument about the need for 
taxes to be approved by the Towns, applied to putting into practise stabilisation policies. 
 The writings mentioned above came mainly from arbitristas representing local 
interests and they differed from the stabilisation programme put into practice by the Crown 
mainly in the way it should be administered. Many of those stabilisation proposals included 
banking schemes in one way or the other,23 with the general characteristic of opposing to the 
idea of subjects bearing the cost of a devaluation. 
A plead for representative money 
Out of all proposals produced in 1627, one stands out for its sophistication, as it 
develops the idea of the introduction of a national banking system and circulation of paper 
money with legal tender. The treatise in question is an anonymous manuscript. 24  The 
manuscript is undated, but its content suggests that it was written between March and 
December 1627. According to Carrera Pujal, 25 the author could be Tomas Cardona, an army 
captain from Seville, who issued other stabilisation proposals, the best known one dated in 
1619.26 
As part of his alternative proposal, the author suggests the introduction of copper coins 
with high intrinsic value in order to carry out a monetary reform. The reason for him to 
suggest copper coins and not silver or gold was the fact that at that point in time, copper, 
imported from Sweden, was the only metal that the Castilian Crown had access to. The author 
is against coins that consist of alloys because, according to him they are easy to counterfeit 
and difficult to count. He proposes therefore coins made out of copper only. The anonymous 
author shows awareness of the disadvantages that the weight of those coins would bring with 
them in terms of transport costs. He acknowledges the unsuitability of such coins for small 
trade transactions and puts forward the idea of avoiding the circulation of such coins. Instead, 
the coins should be kept in banks and banks should issue paper certificates that would 
circulate in lieu. Departing from this principle, the author develops a plan based on the 
introduction of paper money in order to avoid transport costs.  
In addition, this author’s plan contains further features that are in line with those of a 
central bank: The newly created bank’s activities were to be directed by governors, who 
would at the same time act as representatives to the Crown. It was the responsibility of the 
governors to keep an established reserve and to prevent the over- issue of copper coin 
certificates. A detailed accountancy system was also to be followed by them. The banks 
would be outside the reach local legislation, since the governors should be given juridical 
powers regarding bank’s affairs. The governors should also have representatives in every 
Castilian town, what would give this scheme a ubiquitous character within Castile. This 
anonymous manuscript contains what might be one of the earliest designs of a national bank 
in Spain, as Carrera Pujal already observed. 27  The author of this proposal sees in 
representative money the solution to Castile's monetary problems. According to his plan, the 
Crown was the only entity responsible for covering the cost implied in the implementation of 
his plan however, the fact that the bank's governors were to act as representatives to the 
                                                 
23 Analytical literature on this topic goes back to the 1940’s. Earl Hamilton’s23 work focuses mainly (but not 
exclusively) on schemes proposing the establishment of credit- issuing institutions. Carrera Pujal23 
provides an overview of various treatisies (including the ones featured in this paper) that present what 
could be identified as both commercial and/ and national banking schemes. 
In more recent years, Anne Dubet23  has analyzed 16th and 17th- Century projects that feature the 
introduction of pawn houses in Castile, many of which are linked to stabilisation proposals. 
24 Anonymous, untitled, undated, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Mss.6731 fol.115r- 128r 
25 Carrera Pujal, 1943: 572-574 
26 Cardona’s Proposicion was published in Alonso Carranza’s Aiustamiento in Madrid, 1629. 
27 Carrera Pujal, 1943: 572-574 
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Crown, allowed for the Crown to gain control over the currency, which was not in line with 
the Towns' interests. 
The devaluation of 1628 marks the eventual forced acceptance of fiat money, which 
was 50% unsound. Further manipulations, a as coin re- stamping with higher face values, 
followed in later years, as well as recurring devaluations, until a monetary reform was carried 
out between 1682 and 1686.28  
Conclusions 
Under the existence of a fragmented fiscal system in a given area, and in the absence 
of a generally accepted institution guaranteeing the soundness of such currency, a solution is 
to opt for commodity money. Given the political structure prevailing in 17th- century Castile, 
in which the Crown's capacity was limited by the borders of the Towns' realms, and given the 
limited options of currency types available at that time, commodity money was the only type 
of money in line with the Kingdom's political structure. The existence of commodity money 
gave control to the Towns over the introduction of an inflation tax, which, as the introduction 
of any tax, was considered as illegal under Castilian law. A flaw in the representative system 
described by Juan de Mariana in his de Monetae, allowed the Crown to make use of the regal 
stamp to help finance the Crown's deficit. As the monetary system showed the first signs of 
instability, stabilisation proposals show the perceptions of the transition through which 
Castilian monetary system underwent: from commodity money to sound fiat money and 
finally to unsound fiat money. As it was pointed out, monetary reforms designed in 
stabilisation proposals imply the introduction of a tax in one way or the other. That tax could 
take the form of using silver owned by the subjects as a means of financing the stabilisation 
project, or increasing the actual number of taxes collected locally. All those proposals 
indirectly accepted the inflation tax and suggest a "swap" of inflation tax against another form 
of taxation.  
The suggestion by an anonymous author featured in previous paragraphs, consisted of 
the introduction of representative money on the basis of copper deposits, a metal he thought 
the Crown had easy access to, despite having to import it. Although the anonymus author held 
the opinion that the Crown should be responsible for the financing of his project, through his 
proposed monetary reform, the subjects would not be fully compensated via exchange rate for 
their losses incurred as a consequence of debasement. From a political point of view, his 
proposal implied a distortion of the existing balance between Towns and Crown similar to the 
one accompanying the introduction of fiat money, as the convertibility of the paper currency 
in his plan would have been in the hands of an "independent" body of governors, who 
reported to he Crown. 
The introduction of fiat money in 1602 was justified by necessitas, and the 
convertibility of such money relied on expected future arrivals of precious metals. This 
justification allowed the penetration of the Crown's fiscal governance through the realm of 
Towns. The central character of the inflation tax gave way to opposition, in an attempt by the 
Towns to regain their control over tax matters. 
The trust in fiat money was breeched in1628, when, by decree, the Crown reduced the 
nominal value of fiat money by 50%. The acceptance that fiat money was unsound and that 
subjects would not be compensated for devaluations became a recurrent issue throughout 
17th- century Castile: the Crown had taken control over the inflation tax, which was used to 
finance its deficit. The Towns' approval was no longer necessary. 
                                                 
28 Garcia de Paso, José I, “La Estabilización Monetaria en Castilla bajo Carlos II”, Revista de Historia 
Económica, vol. 18, no. 1, 2000, pp. 49-77. Garcia de Paso, José I, “La Estabilización Monetaria en 
Castilla bajo Carlos II”, Revista de Historia Económica, vol. 18, no. 1, 2000, pp. 49-77.  
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The specific interaction between the local and the global, but also between the national 
and the private, demonstrating the globalisation’s mechanisms during the last decades 
of the 19th century, was the central questions examined in the Session "Business with 
money: monetary politics and capital flows in the era of the first globalisation" 
organised by C. Brégianni in the framework of the XVI EBHA Conference, Paris, 
EHESS, 29 August - 1 September 2012. In this Session we tried to apply a 
comparative approach concerning monetary systems and numismatic activity; we 
attended to investigate the past experiences of monetary cooperation but also the 
cultural transfer and the economic asymmetry that coin’s fabrication often represents. 
 
The round table "Small change: bronze or copper coins from Antiquity to 19th c.," was 
organized by Georges Depeyrot in Paris at the École Normale Supérieure in 2013 (13 - 
14 May) in the framework of the ANR DAMIN program and of the LabEx TransferS. 
During this meeting, the participants tried to understand the role of the small coins 
(copper, bronze, brass, etc.) in the economy, in the monetarisation of societies and the 
relation between small change and gold and silver coins.  
 
The last round table "Transfers of precious metals and their consequences, 16th – 19th" 
took place in Madrid at the Casa de Velázquez on 16 - 17 May 2013. It was organized 
by Georges Depeyrot and Marina Kovalchuk in the framework of the ANR DAMIN 
program and of the LabEx TransferS with the support of the Casa de Velázquez. The 
aim was to compare the consequences of the two main arrivals of precious metals in 
history, during the 16th century and during the 19th century. The choice of Madrid was 
linked to the role of Spain and Portugal in relation with the first arrival of gold and 
silver.  
